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1 Introduction
This paper investigates from an empirical perspective the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital,
focusing on the experience of Uganda during the last decade. Civil conicts have persistent devastating
e¤ects on economic development (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008, Collier and Hoe­ er 2004, Collier,
Hoe­ er and Rohner 2009, Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007, and Walter 2004). Their legacy involves
more than physical and human capital destruction. The aftermaths of civil conicts are often plagued
by the breakdown of civic and economic cooperation within society. We are motivated by recent
theoretical work (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2011; Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2012), arguing that
war leads to a collapse of trust and social capital which in turn carries the seeds of further ethnic
conicts. Yet, there are instances in which wars appear to cement rather than destroy cooperation.
Historically, wars promoted nation building in Europe (Tilly 1975), while the aftermath of World
War II in Western Europe was characterized by strong institutional development involving social
cooperation, renewed national identity and sustained high economic growth (Eichengreen 2008). While
the post-war dynamics of international conicts are arguably di¤erent from those of civil wars, Bellows
and Miguel (2009) also report evidence of positive social capital developments in Sierra Leone after
the devastating civil conict of 1991-2002.1 The goal of this paper is to address two questions: First, is
there evidence of causal e¤ects of war on inter-ethnic trust? Second, how do such e¤ects di¤er across
di¤erent dimensions of trust and social capital?
We document causal e¤ects of ethnic conict on trust and ethnic identity using individual, county-
and district-level data from Uganda. Uganda is a natural environment for such a micro-study. It is an
ethnic mosaic consisting of at least 52 groups. Ethnic (or ethnic-related) conicts have been pervasive
in this country at least since independence in 1962. The history of military coups and violent regime
changes is associated with the hegemony of di¤erent ethnic groups, the main divide being that between
the Nilotic people of the North, and the Bantu people of the South. Since 1985, Uganda has been
ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, who participated rst
in the demise of Idi Amin Dada, and then in the rebellion against Amins successor (and former
predecessor), Milton Obote. Although generally viewed as non sectarian, Musevenis government
has its main constituency in the Bantu-dominated South, while it has faced resilient opposition and
armed rebellion in the North of the country, especially in the "Acholiland" region. The Acholi people,
traditionally the warrior elite of Uganda, had been loyal to Obote and have remained by-and-large
alienated from the NMR. The main military challenge against the government has come from the
Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a sectarian Acholi-nationalistic group led by Joseph Kony and active
in Northern Uganda. Not only Acholiland has been troubled by rebellion. The second most important
rebel army, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), running on an Islamic radical agenda, was active
in the Western border area of Uganda, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey to analyze whether people who have been victimized in the civil
war in Sierra Leone are a¤ected in their post-war behavior. In particular, they nd that more victimized people are more
likely to attend community meetings, and to join social and political groups.
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Other areas have also been troubled by traditional tribal and ethnic conicts.
Our empirical strategy exploits an exogenous change in the policy against internal insurgency
that occurred in 2001, after the September 11 attack. The declaration of "war against terror" was a
turning point. In earlier years, the international community had tried without much success to promote
negotiated settlements of the Ugandan conicts.2 In 2001, the US Patriot Act o¢ cially declared the
LRA and the ADF to be terrorist organizations. Among its consequences, the ruling Sudanese National
Islamic Front that had secured sanctuary and military hardware to the LRA withdrew its support to
the rebel army. These shifts provided the opportunity for Musevenis government to pursue a military
crackdown on the rebel armies.3 On the one hand, the ADF was annihilated and has ceased any
signicant military activity within Uganda since 2004. On the other hand, in March 2002, the army
launched a large-scale o¤ensive, named "Operation Iron Fist", against the LRA bases in South Sudan.
The LRA responded by attacking many villages and the government forces in Northern Uganda. Both
ghting sides appear to have exercised brutal violence against civilians (Finnström 2008). Military
activity and reprisals peaked in 2003, then the rebel activity declined considerably as of 2004. In 2005,
the LRA was forced to move its bases to the Democratic Republic of Congo, while the International
Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and other LRA commanders. A cease-re
between the LRA and the government of Uganda was signed on September 2006, with the mediation
of the autonomous government of South Sudan. Negotiations about a permanent settlement continued
in Juba (South Sudan). Although hopes were later frustrated by Konys refusal to sign the peace
agreement in 2008, LRA-related ghting in Uganda has been sporadic after 2006.
Figure 1 shows the total number of geo-referenced ghting events between 1997 and 2008 from
Armed Conicts Location Events Data (ACLED). Between 2000 and 2008 ACLED reports over 2600
ghting events. Consistent with the narrative above, there was a sharp escalation in 2002-05. This is
followed by a decline, and very low levels of violence have been recorded since 2006. It is worth noting
that the escalation of violence in 2002-05 is not merely an Acholi phenomenon. An increasing number
of conicts were recorded all over Uganda in this period (see Figure 2). This justies studying the
e¤ect of conict across all Uganda.
We are interested in measuring the e¤ects of such ghting on di¤erent measures of trust and ethnic
identity. To this aim, we exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer 2000 and 2008, including
information on socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level.4 The Afrobarometer is a repeated
2An example of this strategy is the Amnesty Act of 2000, by which the Government of Uganda granted amnesty
to all rebels who would abandon violence, renouncing to criminal prosecution or punishment for o¤enses related to the
insurgency.
3An additional factor was the end of the Second Congo War, which made it possible to the armed forces of Uganda
to concentrate on the internal front.
4Although Afrobarometer also ran a survey in 2005, we decided to use the 2008 data, since the number of conicts
was still relatively large in 2005 (see Figure 1). Moreover, the number of people living as refugees was very large in 2005.
This raises two issues. On the one hand, the hardship of life in refugee camps may be responsible for the low trust of
respondents. On the other hand, although, as we document below, most camps were located close to peoples village of
residence, some people may have been displaced outside of their counties, rendering our identication strategy invalid.
The problem is far less severe in 2008.
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Figure 1: Number of Fighting Events Over Time in Uganda
cross section of individuals (a panel at the district-level). Our strategy is to regress individual measures
of social capital in year 2008 on spatial measures of intensity of ghting during 2000-08, controlling for
a large number of individual, ethnic and spatial characteristics. Most important, we control for the
average social capital at the district level in 2000, in order to lter out the cross-district heterogeneity
due to long-standing factors.5
We address concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables with two complementary strate-
gies. First, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy. Our identication relies on an external po-
litical shock (i.e., the US enlisting the rebel movements of Uganda as a terrorist organization, and
the Khartoum government withdrawing support to the LRA) a¤ecting the intensity of ghting, but
having no direct e¤ect on trust measures. This political shock impacted the probability of ghting in
a spatially heterogeneous way with a larger increase observed in high elevation areas and in Northern
Uganda, and more specically close to the Sudanese border. We use the county-level average distance
from Sudan as a rst instrument for the number of ghting events. We use the county-level maximum
altitude as an additional instrument, since this also a¤ects the probability of guerrilla activities (cf.
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier, Hoe­ er, and Rohner 2009).6
We also consider an alternative identication strategy relying on the within-county variation in
5The district of the respondent is the most disaggregated geographical information provided by the 2000 Afrobarometer
6Although both instruments are time invariant, our identication relies on the fact that such geographical character-
istics a¤ected the number of ghtings in the post-2001 environment. So, in a sense, our instruments are the interaction
between the 2001 political shock and the above mentioned geographic characteristics.
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conict involving di¤erent ethnic groups. In particular, we exploit the information provided by ACLED
identifying the rebel groups and ethnic militias involved in each single conict event. When conicts
involve organized rebel groups, we map each rebel group or ethnic militia (whenever possible) to their
main ethnic a¢ liation. Then, we regress measures of trust and identity on the number of conict events
involving di¤erent ethnic groups within each county, controlling for both county and ethnic group xed
e¤ects. Our hypothesis is that respondents should be especially a¤ected by events involving their own
ethnic group.7
Our main nding is that ghting events have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on
"trust towards other people from Uganda". The estimated e¤ect is quantitatively large, and robust to
instrumenting ghting events by distance to Sudan and altitude. A one-standard-deviation increase
in ghting translates into a 47% standard deviation decrease in trust. The e¤ect is stronger when
ghting events involve the respondents ethnic group. Fighting has smaller e¤ects, instead, on "trust
in known people" and hardly any e¤ect on "trust in relatives". The ndings suggest that ghting
induces distrust mainly towards people outside the ordinary social network. Moreover, people living
in counties experiencing more ghting report a large increase in a self-reported measure of "ethnic
identity", i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic group relative to national
Ugandan a¢ liation. This result is robust to the inclusion of county and ethnic group xed e¤ects.
Moreover, the results are not driven by the Acholi region, the most tormented by the conict between
the LRA and the government. Excluding all counties of core Acholiland does not a¤ect the estimates.
In Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011), we argue that by undermining trust, conict hinders
economic cohesion in ethnically divided societies. A thorough empirical investigation of this question
would require a longer time span of data. However, in the second part of the paper, we make a rst
step in this direction by extending the analysis to the economic e¤ects of ethnic conicts. Ideally, we
would like to use county-level GDP per capita. However, such data are not available for Uganda. We
resort to proxying them by using the subjective information contained in the Afrobarometer where
people are asked an assessment of their own economic situation (the same question was asked in both
2000 and 2008, so we can control for the district-level economic situation in 2000). Since we use
the Afrobarometer survey of 2008 (while, recall, most ghting events are in the period 2002-05), the
responses are unlikely to reect the direct economic e¤ects of conict, due to, e.g., destructions of
villages or crops. We document an interesting interaction e¤ect: for a given intensity of ghting,
post-conict economic recovery depends on the ethnic fractionalization at the local level. Fighting has
a negative e¤ect on the economic situation in highly fractionalized counties, but has less of an e¤ect
in less fractionalized counties. Since survey-based data about the economic situation are subject to
perception biases, we repeat the analysis using an alternative proxy of the level of economic activity,
i.e., the average intensity of light recorded by U.S. meteorological satellites during night for each
county in Uganda in our years of interest.
7People may also respond to violence involving their own ethnic group outside of the district where they live. However,
such events are likely to be observed less precisely. Interestingly, we nd that people owning a radio also respond to
out-of-district events involving the own ethnic group.
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The nding that violence that occurred mostly four-to-ve years before the survey has a stronger
e¤ect on economic outcomes in ethnically fractionalized counties is consistent with the view that
conict hinders economic cooperation in ethnically divided societies. The evidence suggests that the
e¤ects of violence on social capital may have weaker e¤ects on economic cooperation when violence
does not involve ethnic cleavages. Therefore, violence may have more persistent e¤ects in an ethnically
divided society.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is part of a large literature on inter-ethnic conict. Several seminal contributions in the
literature link explanations of ethnic turmoil to characteristics of the political process (cf. Horowitz
2000; Gurr 1993, and Varshney, 2003), while most recent formal theories focus on the e¤ect of the
exogenously given population composition (see, e.g., Esteban and Ray 2008, 2011, and Rohner 2011).
Relative to these papers, our study suggests that ethnic identity may be endogenous relative to the
conict dynamics.8
While our study focuses on the e¤ect of conict on social capital, a large empirical literature has
studied over the last decade the opposite channel, i.e., how di¤erent measures of ethnic diversity predict
the outbreak of civil wars.9 However, there is also a growing number of micro-level studies dealing
with the impact of conicts on human capital. Matching household survey data with information on
local war intensity, some papers document that war experience reduces the educational attainment of
the cohorts exposed (cf. Swee 2008 for Bosnia; Leon 2009 for Peru; Akresh and de Walque 2010 for
Rwanda; Shemyakina 2010 for Tajikistan). Blattman and Annan (2009) nd that former abductees
in Uganda have lower education and lower salaries later in life, as well as more psychological distress.
There is also a literature in medicine, nding that child soldiers or children who experienced war are
much more likely to experience depression, post-traumatic stress or anxiety in the months and years
after the event.10
8 In this sense our paper is related to a small literature studying endogenous ethnic identity in contexts that are
very di¤erent. Fryer and Levitt (2004) show that the intensity of "black" identity in the United States and the use of
distinctively black names have varied widely over time, peaking during the period of the Black Power movement.
In a development context, Posner (2004) studies the relations between the Chewas and Tumbukas across the border
between Malawi and Zambia. He shows that although the objective di¤erences between these two groups are the same
on both sides of the border, in Malawi the relations between these two ethnic groups are very hostile and lled with
distrust, while in Zambia they are close allies. His explanation is that this is because in Malawi the groups are large
enough relative to the other groups in the country for being mobilized politically, whereas in Zambia they are both small
players that cooperate together.
Caselli and Coleman (2011) present a theory of ethnic conict where the composition of ethnic groups is endogenous,
as people can switch groups.
Balcells (2011) nds that victimization during the Spanish civil war has had a persistent impact on the victimspolitical
identities (i.e., left-right).
Our paper is also related to the theoretical literature on the emergence of parochial altruism and strengthened within-
group ties in environments characterized by frequent inter-group conicts (cf. Bowles and Gintis 2004; Choi and Bowles
2007).
9See Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Collier and Rohner (2008), Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner
(2009), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2011).
10See Dyregrov et al. (2000); Dyregrov, Gjestad and Raundalen, (2002); Barenbaum, Ruchkin and Schwab-Stone
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The studies above focus on human rather than social capital. More directly related to our work
is the recent literature on the e¤ect of individual war experience on political participation and lo-
cal collective action. In particular, Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey and analyze
whether people who have been victimized in the civil (but not ethnic) war in Sierra Leone are a¤ected
in their post-war behavior. In particular, they nd that more victimized people are more likely to
attend community meetingsand join social and political groups. Related research focuses on the
reintegration of former child soldiers. The study of Blattman (2009) on Northern Uganda nds that
young men who have been abducted and forced into joining rebel forces are subsequently more prone
to vote and engage in local community action. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) nd that past par-
ticipation in abusive military fractions makes reintegration in society harder in Sierra Leone. Further,
ideologues, men and younger ghters have more problems reintegrating than other ex-combatants.
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) study the historical legacy of pre-colonial conict in Africa and nd
that historical conict is negatively correlated with trust levels today.
There is also a related literature based on lab and eld experiments. Whitt and Wilson (2007)
make Bosnians play the dictator game and nd that players treat opponents from the same ethnic
group with more fairness. Voors et al. (2010) nd that players who have been exposed to more
violence in their past behave more altruistically to neighbors and are more risk seeking. Gilligan,
Pasquale and Samii (2010) nd that communities with greater exposure to violence during the civil
war in Nepal exhibit more social capital in behavioral games.11 Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2011)
run experiments in Tajikistan and nd that conict exposure reduces trusting and fair behavior to a
larger extent in interactions with other players from the same area than with people from elsewhere.
They explain this nding by the nature of the Tajik war, where clear frontlines were absent and where
there was much violence within villages. To check whether war exposure breeds aggressive behavior
in the future, Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2011) study the behavior of foreign players in the main
professional soccer leagues in Europe, nding that indeed past civil war exposure correlates with the
number of yellow and red cards received.
Our paper is also related to the literature linking trust and social capital in communities to past
history and ethnic fragmentation.12 While Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) nd that participation in
social activities is lower in ethnically heterogeneous communities, the same authors show in a later
paper that a recent history of traumatic experiences and discrimination, poverty, low education, ethnic
diversity, and economic inequality correlate with low trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).13 Using
Afrobarometer and various historical data, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) nd that individuals living in
(2004); Derluyn et al. (2004); Kohrt et al. (2008).
11Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) nd that in post-conict Liberia donors e¤orts to organize the distribution
of aid in community-driven and democratically administered projects can contribute to partly reconstruct the destroyed
social cohesion of society.
12For a general discussion of the origins and e¤ects of trust and social capital, see the survey articles of Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006) and Fehr (2009). See also Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), Dasgupta (1988, 1999) and Sobel
(2002).
13Related to this, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) nd that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries
have a lower quality of government.
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sub-Saharan African countries whose ancestors belonged to tribes that were subject to a high intensity
of enslavement report lower trust levels today. Our results are complementary to theirs. While they
emphasize persistent e¤ects of events that occurred long time ago, we show that large contemporaneous
shocks can indeed change beliefs and social capital. In a similar vein, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2009) document that bilateral trust across countries depends on the number of years in which the
two countries have been in war during the last millennium. Algan and Cahuc (2010) use inherited
trust of descendents of US immigrants to identify the causal e¤ect of trust on economic growth around
the world, while Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) study the other direction of causality, nding that
growing up during a recession persistently depresses condence in public institutions.
Moving to business links, Fafchamps (2000) and Fisman (2003) nd that African rms are more
likely to obtain supplier and bank credit from rms associated to the same ethnic group. Macours
(2004) shows that in the Guatemalan land rental market where property rights are mostly absent
and ethnic tensions are stronglandlords are more likely to rent out to tenants from the same ethnic
group. These papers are related to the ndings in our paper that ghting appears to have larger
post-war economic e¤ects in ethnically fractionalized counties. Although we have no direct measure
of inter-ethnic business links, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that inter-ethnic business
links are more sensitive to disruptions associated with the collapse of social capital, and thus ethnically
fractionalized counties su¤er larger economic consequences after ghting.
Finally, our paper is related to the limited literature on the consequences of the conict in Uganda.
Aside from the papers already mentioned above, a closely related work to ours is Bozzoli, Brueck and
Muhumuza (2011), who analyze the e¤ect of conict on individual expectations in Northern Uganda.
Their paper is complementary to ours insofar as it documents the e¤ect of di¤erential exposure to
conict. However, they use a di¤erent dataset (the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey) which only
covers the population living in six Northern districts. This survey is only available for 2007, so pre-
conict attitudes cannot be controlled for. Most important, their study focuses on a psychological
dimension rather than on trust. In particular, they show that exposure to conict a¤ects negatively
peoples optimism about future perspectives. A recent paper by De Luca and Verpoorten (2011) 
which is posterior to the rst version of our paper and which was carried out independently studies the
e¤ect of conict in Uganda on associational membership and trust. There are a number of di¤erences
between the two studies, concerning both the methodology and the focus of the contributions. They
use a di¤erent econometric specication which does not control for past trust (which is important in
our identication), nor do they consider ethnic identity. They do not link ghting events to specic
ethnic groups, whereas an important part of our contribution is to study the variation in ethnic violence
involving di¤erent groups within each district. Finally, our study considers persistent economic e¤ects
of ethnic violence on living conditions, whereas theirs does not. Deininger (2003) analyzes household
survey data for Uganda and nds that households that were more heavily a¤ected by civil strife are
less likely to engage in (non-farm) enterprise expansion or startup and are more likely to close down
an existing enterprise. Vargas Hill, Bernard and Dewina (2008) document that in Uganda agricultural
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"cooperatives were much less likely (...) to exist in communities that had recently experienced civil
conict". Finally, Collier (1999) nds that transaction and capital intensive sectors like construction,
transports, nance, and manufacturing su¤ered relatively more from the war in Uganda than less
vulnerable sectors like subsistence agriculture.
Section 2 provides an overview of the historical context of the Ugandan conict. Section 3 describes
the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results regarding the e¤ect of
conict on various measures of trust and ethnic identity. Section 5 analyzes the economic e¤ects of
ethnic conict. Section 6 concludes. A number of additional statistics and robustness tests are in the
Appendix.
2 Context of Conict in Uganda
Already in pre-colonial times the area of what is Uganda today has been ethnically very heterogeneous,
with the main division being between the people of the North who are part of the broader ethnic
category of "Nilotes", while the South has been occupied by people belonging to the "Bantu" ethnic
category.14
The ethnic identities were fostered by the British colonization as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.
In particular, the colonial administration restricted inter-ethnic movements, and "colonial practices
were powerful instruments in the making of more rigid ethnic boundaries and divides in Uganda"
(Finnström, 2008: 38). This is conrmed by Nannyonjo (2005), arguing that the British encouraged
the divisions between the North and the Bantu-dominated South. While the Nilotic tribes (and in
particular the Acholi tribe) were over-represented in the army, they were under-represented in the
administration and white-collar jobs, and generally discriminated (Nannyonjo 2005).
Even after independence in 1962, Ugandan politics remained dominated by ethnicity, and each
leader favored some tribes, and repressed others. "Ugandas rst prime minister, Milton Obote, was
overthrown by his army commander Idi Amin in 1971. During Amins regime (1971-79) Langi and
Acholi soldiers, perceived to be Obotes agents, were treated harshly" (Nannyonjo 2005: 475). After
Amin, it was again the turn of Obote to rule the country, who was followed by Acholi o¢ cer Tito
Okello. During this period, the dominant position of northerners in the army was reinstalled, only to be
dismantled again when Okello lost power in 1986 to the former rebel leader of the National Resistance
Army (NRA) and current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, who is a southerner (Finnström
2008).15 The northerner (and in particular, Acholi) ex-o¢ cers and soldiers of the Ugandan army who
fell from grace under Museveni have since then been important components of the various Northern-
based rebel movements of the last decades. "In April 1987 Joseph Kony started his own military
movement by drawing support mostly from the Acholi UPDA deserters" (Nannyonjo 2005: 476). This
14The following discussion of the context of the Ugandan conict draws heavily on Nannyonjo (2005) and Finnström
(2008).
15"Okellos military junta of Acholi-dominated forces withdrew to their homelands in northern Uganda and later to
Sudan, where they formed the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) to oppose the NRA" (Nannyonjo 2005:
476-7).
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movement eventually became in 1994 the most important and persistent rebel movement of Uganda,
under the name of Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Although the LRA has increasingly multiplied criminal activities and often attacked also people
from their own ethnic background accused of being traitors, the conict has a clear ethnic dimension.
On one side, there are the northern combatants that used to represent the o¢ cial army and are now
considered rebels, and on the other side there are the southern ghters of Museveni who used to be
rebels and now represent the o¢ cial Ugandan army.16 According to Nannyonjo (2005: 475), "the
current conict in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions between the LRA and the Ugandan government
has deep historical roots resulting from ethnic hostilities, colonial-era marginalization of the north,
institutional weaknesses, troubled politics during the post-independence period when military sectors
of di¤erent ethnic groups aspired to regain power from a succession of Ugandan governments, and
from certain external factors". As expressed by Finnström (2008: 74-75), "the majority of people
in central Uganda perceived Musevenis war as a war against a regime of northerners, rather than
the war for democracy. (...) While he was a guerrilla leader, Museveni sometimes propagated Bantu
commonality in an e¤ort to strengthen local support in the immediate war zone. (...) In Musevenis
war propaganda, the enemy was alleged to be northerners in general and Acholi in particular". In the
words of the Womens Commission (2001: 81), "the current conict in northern Uganda has its roots
in ethnic mistrust between the Acholi people and the ethnic groups of central and southern Uganda as
well as in the religious and spiritual beliefs of the Acholi people and the manipulation of these beliefs."
And this distrust has persisted, as "still today it is common for people in Kampala and beyond to
regard people from northern Uganda as backward and martial" (Finnström 2008: 79).
Interestingly, even if the northern population su¤ers not only from large-scale violence and abuse
of the southern government troops (Dolan 2009)17, but is also repeatedly targeted by the LRA, the
primary blame and grievances are still directed against the government in Kampala and the southern
Bantu-speaking tribes that it represents. "The more violence the rebels commit against the noncom-
batant population, the more the government will be blamed by the same exposed people for its failure
to protect and provide for its citizens. A growing number of young people feel that the war increasingly
excludes them from the various modern developments in Uganda" (Finnström 2008: 129).
The role of Sudan is especially important. Since the early 1990s, the Khartoum government had
provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment, allowing its base camps in southern
Sudan. In exchange, the LRA helped the Sudanese army to ght against the south Sudanese rebels.
The Ugandan government, in turn, supported the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Finnström 2008:
84-85). Reciprocal accusations led the two governments to cut diplomatic relationships in 1995,
16According to Finnström (2008) the Museveni government has tried hard to frame the Lords Resistance Army as
unpolitical criminals who attack their own people. In particular, "the rhetoric of a local northern conict in which Acholi
kill fellow Acholi like cannibalistic grasshoppers, reects a more general Ugandan conception of the Acholi as violent and
war-prone" (Finnström 2008: 107).
17According to Finnström (2008: 71), "in northern Uganda, it turned out that the conduct of the Musevenis troops
(...) soon deteriorated. Killings, rape, and other forms of physical abuse aimed at noncombatants became the order of
the day soon after the soldiers established themselves in Acholiland, which was foreign territory for them".
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allegedly because of Sudans support for the LRA in retaliation for the government of Ugandas in-
volvement in the Sudanese governments war against the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A). In early 1999, the former US President Jimmy Carter chaired negotiations to restore
diplomatic relations (see Neu 2002). Progress was slow, until an acceleration occurred after Septem-
ber 11, 2001, when the Sudanese government was under heavy pressure for its support to Islamic
radicalism. In 2002 Uganda and Sudan restored diplomatic relations and signed a protocol which gave
the Ugandan army the right to enter southern Sudan and attack the LRA.
Besides this major violent conict between the southern government and the northern rebels of the
Lords Resistance Army, there have been in recent years several other smaller-scale ethnic conicts in
Uganda. For example, the rebels of Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been ghting the government
in southwestern Uganda, while there has been wide-spread tribal violence in the northeastern Karamoja
region, triggered by cattle raiding (Nannyonjo 2005; Finnström 2008).
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 Data Sources
The backbone of our dataset is the Afrobarometer 2008 survey on Uganda, in which 2431 subjects
were surveyed between July and October 2008, in 55 districts and 125 counties of Uganda.18 ;19 Each
respondent is associated with a district and county of residence, as well as with an ethnic group. We
also use information from Afrobarometer 2000. Note that the nest geographical unit included in the
2000 survey is the district. Thus, we can only construct our control variables from this data source
(particularly, past trust and living conditions) at this level.
The other main data source is the ACLED (Armed Conict and Location Event Data, 2011) dataset
that provides precise geo-location of various categories of ghting events. However, in Afrobarometer,
we ignore the precise geolocalization of respondents. Using ArcGIS, we consequently aggregate ghting
events both at the county- and district-level and match them with the county and district of residence
of Afrobarometer respondents.
All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix, and the descriptive statistics of all
variables used are contained in Table 18 in the Appendix. We describe hereby the main variables.
18Afrobarometer selects samples in the following way: "The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all
citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection
for interview. We strive to reach this objective by (a) strictly applying random selection methods at every stage of
sampling and by (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size wherever possible (...). The
sample is stratied by key social characteristics in the population such as sub-national area (e.g. region/province) and
residential locality (urban or rural)" (Afrobarometer 2011).
19 In Uganda, there are 78 districts which are divided up into 146 counties. The average population of a district in
2009 is about 410000, whereas that of a county is 219000.
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3.2 Main Variables
Dependent variables: We use ve questions from Afrobarometer 2008 and construct the following
dependent (binary) variables at the individual level:
 Generalized trust : "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ugan-
dans?" (question Q84C). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I
trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero. In one of our
robustness checks we show that our estimates are not sensitive to changes in this binarization
procedure.
 Trust in Known People: "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other
people you know?" (question Q84B). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers
either "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
 Trust in relatives: "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives?"
(question Q84A). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I trust them
somewhat" or "I trust them a lot". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
 Ethnic identity : "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being
a _ [Rs Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" (question Q83).
The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "I feel only (Rs ethnic group)"
or "I feel more (Rs ethnic group) than Ugandan". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
In section 4 we denote our dependent variable by TRUST 08 2{ Generalized trust, Trust in Known
People, Trust in relatives, Ethnic identity}. In section 5, we run two regressions where the dependent
variables are proxies for the level of economic activity. The rst such variable is also from Afrobarom-
eter 2008:
 Living conditions: "In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?"
(question Q4B). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either "Neither good
nor bad", or "Fairly good", or "Very good". Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
The second such variable (Satellite light) is a measure of the light intensity during night from
the Satellite Nightlight Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010).
These data have been used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity (see, e.g., Henderson,
Storeygard, and Weil 2011, and Hodler and Raschky 2011).
Main explanatory variables: We use four alternative explanatory variables with variation at
the county-level (at the district-level in several specications), FIGHTING00 08c 2{ All Fighting,
Violence Against Civilians, Battles, Internally Displaced People}. All variables code ghting events
taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst
day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008)
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 All Fighting (main explanatory variable): Total amount of all violent events in a county. It
corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event Type" in ACLED: "Battle-
Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory",
"Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
 Violence Against Civilians: Total number of events coded as "Violence against civilians" in
ACLED.
 Battles: Total number of events coded as "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No
change of territory", and "Battle-Rebels gain territory" in ACLED.
 Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of internally displaced people per district in
2006 from UNHCR (2006).
In an alternative specication (section 4.8), we use the information provided by ACLED to match
(whenever feasible) each event coded in All ghting to a particular ethnic group according to the
classication of Afrobarometer 2008 (Q79). In this alternative specication, All ghting varies on the
ethnic group level, and corresponds to the total number of violent events linked to a tribe.
Primary control variables: We dene as "primary" control variables the ones that have a key
role in our identication strategy, since (as explained below) they allow us to lter out heterogeneity in
the pre-treatment stage. The rst component is a vector of trust/identity variables from Afrobarometer
2000, denoted by TRUST00={Generalized trust 2000, Trust in Known People 2000, Trust in relatives
2000, Ethnic identity 2000}. The variation ofTRUST00 is at the district level. The second component
is a scalar, Slavery, with variation at the ethnic group level. Slavery is borrowed from Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011). It measures the number of people who were enslaved during the nineteenth
century in each ethnic group, normalized by the area of land inhabited by the group. This is their
preferred measure of incidence of slave trade.
The questions asked in Afrobarometer 2000 were not identical to those asked in Afrobarometer
2008. The exact construction of the 2000 variables is deferred to Appendix B. In section 5, the
dependent variable is Living condition, and we control for its analogue in year 2000.
Other control variables: All regressions include a vector of individual sociodemographic controls
(X) from Afrobarometer 2008, consisting of age, education, employment status, gender, rural/urban
location, religion and ownership of a radio and of a TV; and a vector of district-level controls (Z)
including population, urbanization rate, demographic structure, share of manufacture, share of sub-
sistence farming, net migration, fertility, number of micro-enterprises, and unemployment, which are
all from the Census of the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2002). These data are not available at the
county level. Information on elevation is from a geo-referenced shape-le produced by Hijmans Lab
at UCDavis (2010). Finally, we use the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset, which allows
us to compute ethnic fractionalization measures on the county levels (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman
2010).
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Figure 2: Map of Uganda (red dots=conict events, darker green=higher altitude). Sources: ACLED
(2011) and Hijmans Lab at UCDavis (2010).
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
We consider the following benchmark econometric model:
Pr(TRUST 08i;c;e = 1) = 

a0 + a1FIGHTING
00 08
c + a2Slaverye +TRUST
000
d  +X
0
i + Z
0
d + ui;c;e

;
(1)
where i denotes an individual, c a county (where a county is a sub-unit of a district, d), and e an
ethnic group.
We will estimate (i) Probit maximum likelihood models and (ii) linear probability models using
either the ordinary least square (OLS) or the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, in presence of
instrumental variables. Hence,  in equation (1) is either the cdf of a standard normal distribution (in
the Probit model) or the identity function. TRUST 08 yields the di¤erent measures of trust/identity
from Afrobarometer 2008. FIGHTING00 08c is our main explanatory variable, as discussed above. In
the set of tables below, we always report the estimated coe¢ cient a1 capturing the e¤ect of county-level
ghting on trust/identity. In alternative specications we change the scale of analysis by considering
FIGHTING00 08d ; a measure of ghting at the district-level rather than at the county-level.
The primary control variables TRUST00 (a vector) and Slavery (a scalar) are designed to lter
out heterogeneity in the pre-treatment measures of trust at the geographic or ethnic group level. They
play a key role in our identication strategy. Ideally, since our aim is to identify the causal e¤ect of
shocks taking place between the two Afrobarometer surveys, we would like to control for individual
measures of trust in 2000. However, this is not possible since Afrobarometer is not a panel at the
individual level. Filtering out the e¤ect of past trust at the district level, TRUST00 yields the best
approximation to such an ideal specication. Since part of the time-invariant heterogeneity may be
rooted at the ethnic rather than at the geographical level, we lter out heterogeneity in long-term
trust across ethnic groups by controlling for Slavery following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) who
show that it has a large and signicant explanatory power on the average level of trust exhibited by
people belonging to di¤erent ethnic groups in Afrobarometer 2005.
We introduce a set of additional individual sociodemographic control variables (Xi) and district-
level controls (Zd) to lter out additional sources of heterogeneity (with a slight abuse of notation,
we include ethnic fractionalization in the vector Zd; although it is measured at the county level). All
district-level controls are from the Census 2002, and are therefore measured before the outburst of
conict in 2002-05. This reduces concerns about their endogeneity.
In all specications we allow for intracluster correlation of the error terms ui;c;e both in the spatial
and ethnic dimensions.
OLS and Probit regressions might yield inconsistent estimates of a1; due to either reverse causality
or omitted variables bias. We address this concern by an instrumental variable strategy. The concern
for reverse causality is mitigated by the fact that our dependent variable is measured in 2008, three
years past the end of active ghting. This is one of the reasons why we do not focus on Afrobarometer
2005, which surveys Ugandan people while ghting is either still ongoing or a very recent experience
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(see Figure 2). However, reverse causality cannot be completely ruled out if variables are serially
correlated. Perhaps more importantly, unobservable shocks occurring after year 2000 may be driving
both trust and ghting. To this aim, we instrument FIGHTING00 08c by a set of county-level
geographic characteristics fGg that are correlated with the ghting intensity, while having, plausibly,
no direct e¤ect on trust. We focus in particular on the Distance to Sudan and to the Maximum
elevation of each county.
Distance from Sudan is a natural instrument, since Southern Sudan played a crucial role in the
2002-05 military escalation. In particular, before 2001 this region used to be a safe heaven for rebel
movements  most notably for the LRA. However, the events following September 11 forced the
Sudanese government to withdraw its support to the LRA and to let the Ugandan army attack the
LRA bases in Sudanese territory. This triggered the response of the LRA with repeated incursions,
looting and engagements with the army within the Ugandan territory.20
Maximum elevation is also a natural factor a¤ecting ghting. Collier, Hoe­ er, and Rohner (2009)
have found that countries with a larger proportion of mountainous terrain are more amenable to
ghting. They argue that this is because rebels benet from hiding in rough terrain. Hence, in a
setting of classic guerrilla warfare like in Uganda, where clear frontlines and an open battleeld are
lacking, we expect ghting to be most intense in areas close to the rebelshiding grounds.
Our exclusion restrictions require that the error term ui;c;e is uncorrelated with the two instruments.
In this respect, it is important to remember that our primary control variables (TRUST00 and
Slavery) should lter out the long-run correlation between fGg and potential omitted factors. For
instance, if counties (or tribes) neighboring Sudan were less inclined to trust and cooperation, due
to unobserved historical or cultural factors, such factors might have a direct e¤ect on TRUST 08:
However, they would as well a¤ect TRUST00; and as long as their inuence has not changed after
2000 (other than due to ghting), the instruments would be uncorrelated with the omitted variables
conditional on the observables which include TRUST00. To the opposite, problems would arise if
the error term included time varying shocks that are correlated with the geographical variables. An
example might be a weather shock during the period 2000-08. However, we could not nd evidence
of any such major event. In section 4.8 below, we consider a more demanding identication where we
control for ethnic and county-level xed e¤ects.
Finally, one might be concerned with conict-induced migration: Some people may live in 2008 in
di¤erent counties from those where they used to live at the time of the conict, due to the massive
forced population displacements that took place during the conict. However, this concern appears to
be of limited importance in our data. First, by 2008 the majority of displaced people had returned to
their home villages (see UN 2009; UNHCR 2010). The concern might have been more severe in 2005,
when the number of people living in refugee camps peaked at 1.8 millions. This is another reason
20 If we had a longer span of data and a full dynamic model, the instrument would be the interaction between September
11 and "distance to Sudan". Note that "distance to Sudan" could have a direct permanent e¤ect on trust (if, e.g., Acholi
people trust less the Kampala government than people in the rest of Uganda). However, this e¤ect is ltered out by
TRUST 00d : See the discussion below.
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why to not use the information in Afrobarometer 2005. Second, most movements took place within
counties. People were forced to move from rural areas to so-called protected villages established
mostly in local trading centers (UNOCHA 2002, Médecins sans frontières 2004). As a result, cross-
county migration is altogether modest. Given that our main explanatory variable is also dened at the
county-level, the results are unlikely to be contaminated by cross-county conict-induced migration.
4 Results
Table 1 presents the main results of our benchmark estimation, in which the dependent variable is
Generalized trust in 2008. All specications control for the set of control variables discussed in the
previous section. Robust standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnic and county
level.
Consider, rst, the e¤ects of our primary control variables, TRUST00d and Slavery (coe¢ cients
not reported in Table 1). Generalized trust is highly positively correlated with its district-level coun-
terpart in Afrobarometer 2000 (which is, recall, a component of the vector TRUST00d ): the regression
coe¢ cient of "Generalized trust 2000" ranges between 1.27 and 1.86 across the di¤erent specications,
and is always highly signicant. Such a high autocorrelation is reassuring. The coe¢ cient of Slavery
is, as expected, consistently negative: individuals belonging to groups exposed to high enslavement in
the eighteenth century report a lower Generalized trust in 2008, ceteris paribus. The point estimates
range between -0.41 and -0.50, being on the margin of standard levels of statistical signicance (the
p-values range between 0.053 and 0.15 across the di¤erent specications). The fact that the e¤ect of
slavery is smaller than in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) is not surprising, since our regressions control
for trust in 2000 which lters out most of the long-term variation. Consistent with this interpretation,
the coe¢ cient of Slavery turns much larger in absolute value and becomes highly signicant if we omit
TRUST00d in the regression.
Column (1) reports the marginal e¤ect of All ghting in a Probit regression. The estimated
marginal e¤ect is negative (-1.93) and highly signicant: people living in high-ghting counties turned
on average less trustful towards other Ugandans relative to year 2000. In column (2) we report the
results of the same specication as in column (1) using a OLS regression. The coe¢ cient of All ghting
is similar to the marginal e¤ect of the Probit model (-2.06). Columns (3)(7) report the results from
2SLS regressions for the linear probability model. In Appendix A in Table 17 we report the results of
the same set of regressions using IV-Probit, which are very similar. The coe¢ cient of All ghting in the
IV regression is -4.75 (column 3), more than twice as large in absolute value as its OLS counterpart,
and highly signicant. Including in column (4) a measure from the Afrobarometer of the individual
perception of violence (Insecure) does not signicantly alter the results.21 The result is robust to the
21The measure Insecure is based on the individual answers to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever,
have you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?"). In our main specication, we do not focus on this
individual measure of insecurity, because it is heavily endogenous and subject to a problem of potential selection into
victimization (as discussed by Bellows and Miguel (2009)). Yet, it is interesting that the result is robust to controlling
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alternative measures of ghting, including Violence Against Civilians (column (5)), Battles (column
(6)), and Internally displaced people (column (7)).22 In Appendix A in Table 14 we show that the
results of Table 1 continue to hold when the generalized trust variable is not coded as a binary variable,
but left at its original ordinal scale, and when Ordered Probit regressions are run.
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) suggest a procedure aimed to gauge the amount of selection on
unobservable characteristics based on the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables.
This allows to assess how severe the omitted variable bias should be in order for the e¤ect of ghting
to be fully driven by unobserved characteristics. We follow here the implementation procedure used
by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). This amounts to running two regressions: one with a restricted
set of control variables and one with a full set of controls. In our case the natural restricted set of
controls includes the primary controls, TRUST00d and Slavery (i.e., we exclude Xi and Zd). Then, we
calculate the ratio ja^1j =
 a^R1   ja^1j ; where a^1 is the estimated coe¢ cient with the full set of controls
(column (2) in Table 1), while a^R1 is the estimated coe¢ cient with the restricted set of controls. We
obtain a^R1 =  1:02; implying that
a^R1  < ja^1j (since a^1 =  2:06). Given that the point estimate
is not attenuated, and even strengthened, by the inclusion of the full set of controls, selection on
unobservables does not appear to explain our result (if anything, our result would be strengthened if
the unobservables could be controlled for).23
4.1 First stage regression
Panel (a) of Table 2 reports the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments in the rst-stage regres-
sions of 2SLS specications from Table 1 (columns 3-7). In all cases the IV coe¢ cients are highly
signicant with the expected sign. All rst stage regressions pass the Hansen overidentication test.
Robust (Kleibergen-Paap) F-statistics accounting for clustered residuals are large, and always above
the conventional threshold for weak instruments. One should however recall here that the standard
Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instruments are constructed for the case of i.i.d. residuals, and do
not apply to the case of clustered standard errors (see, e.g., Bun and de Haan, 2010). Therefore, the
F-statistics provide no precise diagnostic of the weak instrument problem.
As additional diagnostics, we follow the procedure suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009: 212-
13). Panel (b) of Table 2 reports the coe¢ cient of All ghting in the second stage regression, along
with a number of statistics of the rst-stage regressions from a variety of specications and estimation
techniques. Column (1), reported for comparison, yields the benchmark second-stage estimate (column
(3) in Table 1; column (1) in Panel (a)). Column (2) shows how the results would change if only the
for the individual perception of insecurity.
22We include IDP for two reasons: First, they are a proxy of ghting intensity. Second, forced displacements can be
viewed as a deliberate military strategy in conict (cf. Esteban, Morelli and Rohner 2011). Indeed, some authors see the
protected villages for IDP in Uganda as part of an aggressive military strategy pursued by the Museveni government to
control and oppress the civilian population in the North (Finnström 2008; Dolan 2009).
23Note, though, that the power of this robustness test depends on the explanatory power of the observable character-
istics that are included. In our case, 16 out of the 33 additional control variables are signicant at the 5 percent level
and their inclusion increases the R-squared from 0.09 to 0.13.
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -1.93*** -2.06*** -4.75*** -4.50***
(0.51) (0.78) (1.31) (1.31)
Insecure -0.06***
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -12.00***
(3.11)
Battles -7.21***
(2.21)
IDP -0.69***
(0.18)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2242 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252
Pseudo R-squared 0.102 0.127 0.105 0.112 0.102 0.109 0.141
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity
characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 1: The E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust.
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Figure 3: Distance to Sudan and Trust
most powerful instruments, Distance from Sudan, were retained, and the second instrument,Maximum
elevation, were dropped. The estimated coe¢ cient of All ghting remains signicant at the 99%
condence level, while the F-statistics increases to 21. Next, in column (3) we use a LIML estimator.
This estimator is less e¢ cient but less subject to bias when instruments are weak. The fact that the
results are almost identical to column (1) suggests no bias due to weak instruments. In column (4), we
run a reduced-form regression. The coe¢ cients of the two excluded instruments have the expected sign
and are highly signicant, which is again reassuring. Finally, in columns (5)-(6) we report the results
of a specication where we collapse all variables to the county level. The results are similar to the
benchmark specication using individual level variables. In this specication, standard errors are not
clustered, allowing us to compute standard Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics for i.i.d. residuals which
can be compared to the Stock-Yogo bounds. We obtain F=8.9 in the case in which both instruments
are retained and F=12 for the case with only one instrument. We conclude that our analysis is not
subject to a weak instrument problem.
Figure 3 provides informal evidence about the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. The rst
panel considers counties characterized by a positive number of ghting episodes, while the second
panel considers counties in which no ghting occurred. Each gure plots on the horizontal axes the
distance from Sudan, and on the vertical axes the county-level average of generalized trust ltered
by the set of control variables. Remarkably, the relationship is positive and highly signicant across
counties experiencing violence, while it is insignicant across those experiencing no violence. While
this is by no means a formal test of the validity of our exclusion restriction, this falsication analysis
is an interesting observation.
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Panel A
Dep. var: All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles IDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from Sudan -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.96***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13)
Max. elevation 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252
R-squared 0.775 0.775 0.747 0.722 0.908
Hansen J stat: (p-value) 0.96 0.92 0.35 0.54 0.14
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 16.78 15.85 29.53 11.89 32.72
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at the county level). Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Panel B
Dep.var: Generalized Trust in 2008 (Second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting -4.75*** -4.81*** -4.75*** -4.43*** -4.10**
(1.31) (1.35) (1.31) (1.58) (1.80)
Dist. from Sudan 0.59***
(0.18)
Max. elevation -0.07***
(0.03)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS (LIML) OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instruments Sudan, elev. Sudan Sudan, elev. n/a Sudan, elev. Sudan
Observations 2252 2252 2252 2252 117 117
R-squared 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.132 0.621 0.632
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.96 n/a 0.96 n/a 0.73 n/a
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 16.78 20.99 16.78 n/a n/a n/a
F stat. (Cragg-Donald) n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.87 12.01
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 2: First Stage of Benchmark Regressions (Panel A) and Robustness IV (Panel B).
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4.2 Quantitative e¤ects
The magnitude of the estimated e¤ects is large.24 The dependent variable, Generalized trust, has a
sample mean equal to 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.46. All ghting ranges between 0 and 227
violent events with a standard deviation of 45 events. In table 1, an estimated coe¢ cient of -4.75 in
the 2SLS means that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting (i.e., 45 additional episodes of
violence) translates into a 47% standard deviation decrease in generalized trust (i.e., a decrease in
generalized trust of approximately 21 percentage points). With the more conservative OLS estimate
we get that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting leads to a 20% standard deviation decrease
in generalized trust; the "maximum" e¤ect between counties with no violence and the county with
the highest violence corresponds to a 45 percentage points decrease in trust towards other Ugandans.
This is a very large e¤ect, and is in the order of magnitude of the di¤erence between the Netherlands
(0.48), the eighth most trusting country in world, and the three countries with the lowest trust levels
(Peru (0.05), Brazil (0.05); Philippines (0.06)).25 The quantitative e¤ects are similar when alternative
measures of violence are considered.
4.3 Other dimensions of trust
Table 10 (in Appendix A) is the analogue of Table 1 when the dependent variable is replaced by Trust
in known people. The estimated e¤ects of violence are smaller than in the case of Generalized trust
(especially in the IV regressions), although they remain statistically signicant.
In Table 11 (in Appendix A), the dependent variable is Trust in relatives in 2008. In this case,
the e¤ects are even smaller and become insignicant in the 2SLS regressions. This nding is partially
di¤erent from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who nd that a past history of enslavement has a negative
e¤ect on all dimensions of trust, including trust in relatives. This suggests that the e¤ect of local ethnic
conicts is less pervasive and mostly conned to the inter-ethnic dimension.
4.4 Ethnic identity
To corroborate further the view that local ethnic conicts impact inter-ethnic attitudes, we replace
trust by a measure of Ethnic identity, gauging the extent to which respondents identify themselves
with their ethnic relative to their national a¢ liation. Results are reported in Table 3. The estimated
coe¢ cient of interest is in all cases positive and signicant.26 As in the case of Generalized trust, the
coe¢ cients in the 2SLS regressions are signicantly larger than the OLS counterpart. In the 2SLS
24 In all the tables, the ghting variables have been rescaled by a factor 103 in order to improve readability of their
estimated coe¢ cients.
25These gures correspond to the average percentage of respondents answering "Most people can be trusted" to the
World Values Survey Question A165 "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?". We use the average scores over the rst three waves of the World Values
Survey.
26We repeated the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure to detect problems of selection on unobservables. The restricted
regression yields a^R1 = 0:33, whereas the coe¢ cient in column (2) is a^1 = 0:74: Thus, again, selection on unobservables
does not appear to drive our results.
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting 0.68* 0.74** 2.86** 2.60**
(0.36) (0.37) (1.19) (1.17)
Insecure 0.06**
(0.03)
Violence Civil. 7.37***
(2.58)
Battles 4.30**
(1.93)
IDP 0.43***
(0.14)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2256 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-squared 0.056 0.059 0.040 0.048 0.040 0.042 0.060
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity
characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 3: Ethnic Identity.
regression, a one standard deviation increase in All ghting translates into a 32% standard deviation
increase in ethnic identity (i.e. 12.8 percentage point). The estimated e¤ect between the least and
most conictive districts is a 64.9 percentage point increase in ethnic identity. The quantitative e¤ects
are similar when alternative measures of violence are considered.
The rst-stage regressions yield similar results to those discussed above for the case of generalized
trust (see Appendix, Table 12). Concerning the falsication test, the two panels in Figure 4 show that
the distance from Sudan is negatively correlated with the ethnic identity (conditional on the set of
control variables) across districts experiencing violence, whereas the relationship is insignicant across
districts experiencing no violence. Similarly to the case of trust, distance to Sudan appears to have
an e¤ect on ethnic identity only in the subsample of districts exposed to some ghting.
Finally, we note that in all the regressions discussed in this section the (unreported) coe¢ cient of
ethnic fractionalization does not appear to have a signicant e¤ect on trust or ethnic identity in 2008.
This is not surprising, since there is little time variation in fractionalization, and any time invariant
e¤ect has been ltered out through controlling for measures of trust in 2000. More interesting, one
could expect heterogeneous e¤ects on trust depending on the extent of fractionalization. However,
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Figure 4: Distance to Sudan and Ethnic Identity
this is not the case, as an OLS specication with an interaction yields an insignicant coe¢ cient.
In Appendix A in Table 17 we report the results of the same set of regressions as in this section
but using IV-Probit, which are very similar.
The ndings that conict leads to a stronger ethnic identity and that it has a strong negative and
signicant impact on generalized trust, while having only a weak and non-signicant e¤ect on trust in
family, is consistent with the theoretical literature on the emergence of parochialism and within-group
bias in the face of inter-group conict (cf. Bowles and Gintis 2004; Choi and Bowles 2007).
4.5 Cross-district variations
Tables 4 below and 15 (in the Appendix A) are the analogues of Tables 1 and 3 (for Generalized
trust and Ethnic identity, respectively) when All ghting and the alternative measures of conict are
measured at the district rather than at the county level. Although this specication forgoes some
information at a lower level of aggregation, this robustness check is important, since our primary
control variables ltering out pre-treatment trust are measured at the district rather than at the
county level.27
The results are very robust: all coe¢ cients have the expected sign and remain signicant at the
99% level. In both specications, the coe¢ cients of All ghting and of the alternative measures of
conict are smaller. This is natural, since counties are smaller geographical units and informational
frictions are likely to jam information about events happening far from the respondents residence
(recall that our ghting measures capture even minor events). Therefore, events occurring in the own
county trigger a stronger response than events happening farther away in the same district.
27The cross-district specication was the main specication in the rst draft of this paper (April 2011).
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.48*** -1.41***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.38) (0.38)
Insecure -0.06***
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -2.61***
(0.81)
Battles -2.92***
(0.72)
IDP -0.74***
(0.20)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2242 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.135 0.133 0.136 0.126 0.132 0.141
1st stage: Hansen J stat (p-value) n/a n/a 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.13
1st stage: F stat (Kleibergen-Paap) n/a n/a 26.8 25.9 19.4 28.5 26.3
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for clustering at
district level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at district and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own
TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own
Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net
Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic
Fractionalization), and ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 4: The E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust (District Level).
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In an additional robustness check in Table 16 (in Appendix A) we use exclusively district-level
information. For this purpose, we exclude individual control variables from the right hand side of
equation (1) and collapse all the other variables (both on the right and on the left hand side) at their
district average level. The resulting sample consists of only 49 observations (i.e., districts), implying
a low number of degrees of freedom. Reassuringly, the results are robust and of a similar magnitude
to those in Tables 4 and 15.
4.6 Excluding Acholiland
One might suspect that the previous results are largely driven by Acholiland, the troubled region in
the North where most of the ghting between the government and the LRA took place. In fact, this is
not the case. In Appendix A, Table 13 we focus on the robustness of the benchmark 2SLS estimates of
Generalized trust (Column 3, Table 1) and Ethnic identity (Column 3, Table 3) when the identifying
power of Acholiland is mitigated. Columns (1)-(2) refer to the regression for Generalized trust. In
column (1) we remove from the sample the counties classied as Acholi by the Geo-Referenced Ethnic
Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010).28 In column (2) we remove from the
sample the counties classied as Acholi by the Ethnologue (ETHNO) denition of Acholiland (Lewis
(ed.) 2009). In neither case are the results signicantly di¤erent from the benchmark specication
of Column 3, Table 1. In columns (3)-(4) we perform the corresponding analysis for Ethnic identity
(Table 3). The results are again robust.
4.7 Ethnic group xed e¤ects
In the econometric specication (1), ethnic-specic unobserved heterogeneity in trust is partially
ltered out by controlling for ethnic-level Slavery and by allowing for ethnic-level clustering of error
terms. In this section we rene the procedure by including a full set of ethnic-group xed e¤ects.
This is very demanding from a statistical point of view because Uganda is characterized by a high
level of spatial sorting of ethnic groups. As a consequence the identifying power of our geographical
instruments (distance to Sudan and maximum elevation) is partially absorbed and mitigated by the
xed e¤ects.
We focus on our preferred dependent variables, namely Generalized trust and Ethnic identity.
Tables 5 and 6 are the analogue with ethnic xed e¤ects of Tables 1 and 3, respectively. Both non-
instrumented and instrumented results are robust, albeit quantitatively smaller in absolute value than
those in Tables 1 and 3. In some specications statistical signicance is reduced and is close to the
90% level. As expected, in the instrumented specications the F-statistics of the rst stage regressions
(not reported) fall, in some cases, below the conventional threshold of F=10, conrming that the
identifying power of the instruments is weakened by the inclusion of the ethnic xed e¤ects.
28 In particular, this dummy codes as one all counties where Acholis are the largest ethnic group everywhere in the
territory according to GREG.
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -0.84* -0.93* -3.30*** -3.07***
(0.51) (0.53) (1.22) (1.19)
Insecure -0.06***
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -10.65***
(3.67)
Battles -4.51***
(1.72)
IDP -0.93***
(0.33)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2234 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252 2252
Pseudo R-squared 0.146 0.181 0.170 0.175 0.157 0.175 0.185
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and Ethnicity Fixed
Effects.
Table 5: Generalized Trust with Ethnicity Fixed E¤ects.
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting 0.40 0.44* 2.22* 1.98*
(0.26) (0.24) (1.23) (1.15)
Insecure 0.06**
(0.03)
Violence Civil. 7.88**
(3.47)
Battles 2.90*
(1.73)
IDP 0.76***
(0.24)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2217 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-squared 0.086 0.093 0.085 0.091 0.073 0.089 0.088
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and Ethnicity Fixed
Effects.
Table 6: Ethnic Identity with Ethnicity Fixed E¤ects.
28
4.8 Within-County Ethnic Violence
The analysis so far has shown that violence across Ugandan counties is associated with a decrease
in trust towards other Ugandans and an increase in ethnic identity. In this section, we propose an
alternative empirical strategy addressing two related issues. First, we would like to cast more light on
the mechanism linking violence to trust. The evidence presented so far could be driven by the e¤ects
of inter-ethnic violence on inter-ethnic trust, as well as by the mere exposure of individuals to conict
and violence, irrespective of its causes and of the groups involved. However, some theories, including
our earlier work in Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011), link the e¤ect of war on social capital to
inter-ethnic relationships. According to this view, peoples beliefs should respond to violence targeting
their own ethnic group rather than to generic violence occurring within their own county. We would
like to discriminate between these two channels. Second, the cross-county identication is subject to
a caveat. Counties might be subject to unobservable shocks correlated with both a high incidence
of conict and low trust. For example, the government might have reduced during the period under
consideration transfers or public goods to districts (or counties) populated by hostile ethnic groups.
Unfortunately, we have no direct measure of such policies.
To make progress in this direction, we exploit spatialethnic variations in violence. We use the
information provided by ACLED about the nature of each conict event. Each episode is classied
as involving specic rebel groups or ethnic militias, civilians, or the Ugandan army. Many rebel
groups have a main ethnic a¢ liation, e.g. if the ACLED data lists a "battle" between "Bafumbira
Ethnic Militia" and "Batooro Ethnic Militia", this would be linked to both the Bafumbira and the
Batooro ethnic groups, and, for example, events involving the LRA can be linked to the Acholi group.
Therefore, we can associate most events with one or more ethnic groups involved, as well as with the
counties where they occurred.29 Having constructed such a variable, we identify the e¤ect of violence
on trust and ethnic identity out of the within-county variation in the number of events involving
di¤erent ethnic groups, possibly after controlling for both county and ethnic group xed e¤ects.
To begin with, column (1) of Table 7 yields the results of the Probit specication of Column
(1) in Table 1 after splitting the variable All ghting at the county-level into events involving (i.e.
Fight(Tr,Cou)) and not involving (i.e. Fight(OtherTr,Cou)) the respondents ethnic group. The coe¢ -
cient of Fight(Tr,Cou) (-2.20) is highly signicant and twice as large as the coe¢ cient of Fight(OtherTr,Cou),
which is statistically insignicant. Column (4) reports the analogue coe¢ cient for the regression in
which the dependent variable is Ethnic identity (cf. Table 3). The results are similar only the co-
e¢ cient of Fight(Tr,Cou) (0.78) is signicantly positive. These regressions show that ghting events
linked to a respondents own ethnic group have a stronger e¤ect on Generalized trust and Ethnic
identity than have ghting events involving other ethnic groups.
We consider, next, a very demanding specication including both county and ethnic xed e¤ect.
29We have followed a conservative matching strategy, only linking events that can be attributed with a very high
condence to particular groups. The results are similar when a more aggressive matching strategy is used, or when
particular rebel groups are removed. The matching table is available from the authors upon publication.
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Dep. var.: Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Identity Identity Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fight(OtherTr,Cou) -1.09 0.28
(0.71) (0.51)
Fight(Tr,Cou) -2.20*** 0.78**
(0.64) (0.37)
Fight(Tr)*Fight(Cou) -0.31 -0.40 1.83** 1.87**
(0.67) (0.69) (0.89) (0.81)
Fight(Tr)*Radio -0.08** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Effects No County, Tribe County, Tribe No County, Tribe County, Tribe
Observations 2242 2341 2341 2256 2280 2280
R-squared 0.102 0.204 0.205 0.057 0.118 0.12
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported  individual
sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), and
columns (1) and (4) for  districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in
Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of
Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment
Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 7: Ethnic Fighting, Generalized Trust and Identity.
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In this specication, the main e¤ects of ghting are absorbed by the xed e¤ects and the variable of
interest becomes Fight(Tr)*Fight(Cou); which is an interaction term of all ghting events occurring in
the county of which the respondent is resident times all ghting events throughout Uganda involving
the ethnic group of the respondent. All spatial controls are now absorbed by the county xed e¤ects.
The main results are presented in columns (2) for Generalized trust and (5) for Ethnic identity.
The point estimates of the interaction e¤ects are, as expected, negative (-0.31) and positive (1.83),
respectively, although only the coe¢ cient in the regression for Ethnic identity is statistically signicant
(at the 5% level).
So far, besides the last specication of columns (2) and (5), we have throughout the paper focused
on the e¤ects of violence which occurred in the respondents county. This is a plausible assumption,
since our All ghting variable codes even minor episodes whose knowledge is unlikely to be shared
across all Ugandans. However, well-informed individuals may be a¤ected by the exposure to the news
of ethnic violence involving their group anywhere in Uganda. In columns (3) and (6), we include
Fight(Tr)*Radio, an interaction between the ownership of a radio and the number of ghting events
at the Ugandan national level involving the respondents group. As expected the interaction coe¢ cient
is negative and signicant in the case of Generalized trust, and positive and signicant in the case of
Ethnic identity. People owning a radio are more responsive to the news of violence involving their own
ethnic group anywhere in Uganda.30
In conclusion, this section shows that the ethnic channel plays an important role. In (unreported)
regressions, we show that results are also robust to controlling for the self-reported measure of indi-
vidual exposure to violence, Insecurity. This implies that the results of this Section do not appear to
be driven by the personal threat su¤ered by members of specic groups. Moreover, the within-county
results rule out that the increase in ethnic identity is driven by targeted government policies, e.g., the
government spending less on hostile districts or counties. A caveat is that we cannot instrument the
within-county variation in events involving di¤erent ethnic groups. Yet, we believe that the di¤erent
econometric subsections discussed in this section provide jointly robust evidence of a causal e¤ect of
ethnic conict on di¤erent dimensions of social capital.
5 The Heterogenous E¤ects of Conict on Economic Activity
In this section we study the e¤ect of violence on economic outcomes and living standards. Ideally, we
would like to use county-level GDP as the dependent variable, but this is not available in Uganda. We
use two alternative proxies. First, we use information from the responses to the Afrobarometer 2008
30We interpret this result as an interesting correlation. There is a growing literature studying politico-economic e¤ects
of mass media (see Strömberg 2004 for a seminal contribution). Recent applications to ethnic conict include Della
Vigna et al. (2011), and Yanagizawa (2010), focusing respectively on partisan radio broadcasting in the Serbo-Croatian
and Rwandan conicts. These papers show that an exogenous increase in the exposure to radical news a¤ects peoples
attitude about ongoing conicts. In this paper, we do not try to identify exogenous variation in the exposure to radio
broadcasting. Thus, the e¤ect identied by our regression could reect some self-selection of individuals in the decision
of owning a radio.
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question about individual living condition. Living condition is set equal to one whenever the survey
respondent declares his living conditions to be either good or very good, and is set to zero when the
respondent declares them to be either bad or very bad. The main problem with this variable is that
it may reect subjective assessments potentially a¤ected by non-economic components of well-being.
Second, we use Satellite Nightlight Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(2010). The raw data is produced by meteorologic satellites that measure light intensity during night.
These data have been used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity (cf. for example
Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2011, and Hodler and Raschky 2011). The exact data construction
is detailed in the Data Appendix.
The focal point of our analysis is the extent to which post-conict recovery is heterogeneous across
counties characterized by di¤erent ethnic fractionalization. In particular, our hypothesis is that if
conict destroys inter-ethnic trust, more fractionalized counties that depend more heavily on inter-
ethnic business would su¤er stronger and more persistent economic e¤ects.
When the dependent variable is Living condition, we estimate the following equation:
LIV ING_COND08i;c;e = [0 + 1LIV ING_COND
00
d + 2FIGHTING
00 08
c + 3FRACc (2)
+4FIGHTING
00 08
c  FRACc + 5Slaveryd +X0i + Z0d + ui;c;e]:
In the case of Satellite light, the dependent variable is measured at the county level and we ignore
all individual information. We consequently estimate the following equation:
SATELL_LIGHT 08c = [0 + 1SATELL_LIGHT
00
c + 2FIGHTING
00 08
c + 3FRACc(3)
+4FIGHTING
00 08
c  FRACc + uc]:
We use a Tobit regressor since satellite light data are censored at zero. In both specications, the
main coe¢ cient of interest is 4:
The results are reported in Tables 89. Column (1) in both tables shows that All ghting has
a negative (but statistically not robust) e¤ect in 2008 once initial conditions in 2000 are controlled
for. Column (2) in Table 8 shows that there is a negative and signicant interaction e¤ect: Fighting
a¤ects Living condition negatively in highly ethnically fractionalized counties. Since the main e¤ects
are measured at a zero level of fractionalization, the insignicant coe¢ cient on All ghting indicates
that violence has no economic e¤ect in non-fractionalized counties. The result is robust to using OLS
instead of Probit (column (3)). A similar result is found in the Tobit regression of Table 9 with
Satellite light as the dependent variable.
As usual, it is di¢ cult to instrument the interaction term. To make progress in this direction, we
follow Besley and Persson (2011) and split the sample into high- and low-fractionalization counties,
instrumenting in each specication All ghting with the same geographic characteristics as previously.
Since 47% of the counties have zero fractionalization, and 75% have a measure of fractionalization
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Dependent variable: Living Conditions in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Liv. cond. 2000 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 0.01 1.29*** 0.14 0.25** 0.07
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.28) (0.24) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
All fighting -0.82* -0.69* -0.68** -1.89 2.69
(0.43) (0.40) (0.33) (1.29) (8.16)
Ethnic frac. 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.16 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.26) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Fighting*Frac -5.04 -4.82**
(3.49) (1.93)
Civ. viol. -3.02**
(1.29)
Civ.*Frac -16.28**
(8.11)
Battles -0.71
(0.56)
Battles*Frac -6.15
(4.47)
IDP -0.28***
(0.10)
IDP*Frac -0.72*
(0.39)
Method Probit Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit
Sample All All All Low Frac. High Frac. All All All
Observations 2236 2236 2241 1687 554 2236 2236 2236
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.081 0.080 0.200 0.063 0.058 0.065
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for clustering at
county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural,
Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust
in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence
Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics
(Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 8: Explaining Living Conditions in 2008.
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below 23%, we set the threshold at the top quartile. Thus, the sample of low-fractionalization (high-
fractionalization) counties consists of the three lowest quartiles (respectively, top quartile). The coef-
cient of interest are now the main e¤ects of All ghting, separately for low- and high-fractionalizaton
counties, in columns (4)-(5) of Table 8 and in columns (3)-(4) of Table 9, respectively. In the case of
the Living condition (Table 8), we nd no signicant di¤erence: all estimated coe¢ cients are small
and imprecisely estimated. In contrast, in the case of Satellite light (Table 9), ghting is associated
with a large and signicant fall in living conditions in high-fractionalization counties (column (4)), and
with no signicant e¤ect in less fractionalized counties (column (3)).31 The coe¢ cient of All ghting
in high-fractionalization counties is seven times larger. In the last three columns of the tables 8 and
9 we show that the results are similar for alternative measures of ghting.
The nding that ethnic violence dating back to 2002-05 has a negative e¤ect on economic outcomes
measured in 2008 in ethnically fractionalized counties is consistent with the view that conict hinders
economic cooperation in ethnically divided societies. The evidence suggests that the e¤ects of violence
on social capital has weaker e¤ects on economic cooperation when violence does not involve ethnic
cleavages. In other words, violence appears to have more persistent e¤ects in ethnically divided areas.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital, focusing on the experience of Uganda during
the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document causal e¤ects of an outburst
of civil conict in 2002-05, driven by an exogenous shock linked to US foreign policy, on post-conict
trust and ethnic identity. We nd that the extent of ghting has a strong and statistically signicant
negative impact on Trust towards other Ugandans between 2000 and 2008. The estimated e¤ect is
quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of violence and
di¤erent statistical techniques. The e¤ects on Trust in relatives is insignicant. On the contrary,
people living in districts experiencing more violence report a strong increase in a measure of Ethnic
identity, i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic group relative to alternative
forms of national a¢ liation. Thus, conict appears to strengthen within-ethnic group solidarity. This
nding is consistent with the casual evidence that social capital is fueled by external wars: countries
acquire a stronger internal cohesion.
The results are robust to various specications including instrumental variable strategy. In addi-
tion, the ndings are robust to a demanding identication strategy relying on the variation within each
district in the ethnic violence involving di¤erent ethnic groups. The importance of ethnic elements
suggests that the destruction of social capital may not be a psychological response only due to the
mere exposure of individuals to violence. Nor do the ndings appear to be driven by fear or insecurity
at the individual level, since these are controlled for in some of our regressions.
31The small sample size in the split sample reduces the power of the rst-stage regression. The Kleibergen-Paap F-stats
are well below ten, raising a concern with a weak-instrument bias.
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Dependent variable: Satellite light in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sat.light (2000) 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.93*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.82***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
All fighting -0.72 -0.44 -1.86 -13.22**
(1.32) (1.32) (1.98) (5.50)
Ethnic frac. 0.04 0.15 2.92 0.29 0.14 0.12 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (2.00) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Fighting*Frac -29.83**
(13.67)
Civ. viol. -0.54
(3.05)
Civ.*Frac -68.43**
(30.26)
Battles -0.54
(2.06)
Battles*Frac -47.26
(27.12)
IDP -0.10
(0.15)
IDP*Frac -10.40***
(3.97)
Method Tobit Tobit IVTobit IVTobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Sample All All Low Frac. High Frac. All All All
Observations 125 125 75 43 125 125 125
Log Pseudolikelihood -21.64 -19.18 152.23 154.31 -19.02 -19.82 -18.18
Note: The unit of observation is a county. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. All specifications control for  districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in
Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence
Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate) and county
characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization).
Table 9: Explaining Living Conditions in 2008 (Measured Using Satellite Light Data).
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We also study post-conict economic recovery. Few years after the conict outburst, the intensity of
ghting has a negative e¤ect on the economic situation in highly fractionalized counties, but no e¤ect
in less fractionalized counties. We interpret this nding as consistent with recent theories emphasizing
the negative e¤ect of ethnic conict on inter-ethnic economic cooperation and business links that we
studied from a theoretical perspective in a recent companion paper (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti
2011). Our empirical results suggest the existence of such a self-reinforcing process between conicts
and ethnic cleavages.
We plan to extend the approach in this paper to the study of civil conicts in other African
countries.
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Appendix A (not for publication): Additional Tables
In this Appendix we provide a number of additional tables that are referred to in the text.
Dependent variable: Trust in Known People in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -1.79*** -1.80*** -3.54*** -3.19***
(0.44) (0.65) (1.14) (1.16)
Insecure -0.08**
(0.03)
Violence Civil. -7.80**
(3.06)
Battles -5.74***
(1.74)
IDP -0.42**
(0.17)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2240 2250 2250 2250 2250 2250 2250
Pseudo R-squared 0.066 0.091 0.082 0.090 0.080 0.083 0.098
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity
characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 10: Trust in Known People.
1
Dependent variable: Trust in Relatives in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -0.99*** -1.00*** -0.83 -0.64
(0.34) (0.22) (0.70) (0.75)
Insecure -0.05**
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -1.70
(1.59)
Battles -1.39
(1.10)
IDP -0.09
(0.09)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2245 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257
Pseudo R-squared 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.071 0.067
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for
clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at county and ethnicity level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics
(Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization,
Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity
characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 11: Trust in Relatives.
2
Panel A
Dep. var: All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles IDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from Sudan -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.96***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13)
Max. elevation 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
R-squared 0.775 0.775 0.747 0.722 0.908
Hansen J stat: (p-value) 0.81 0.75 0.66 0.50 0.46
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 16.81 15.89 29.55 11.89 32.53
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at the county level). Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Panel B
Dep.var: Ethnic Identity in 2008 (Second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting 2.86** 3.48*** 2.86** 3.38*** 2.69**
(1.19) (1.27) (1.19) (1.20) (1.20)
Dist. from Sudan -0.38***
(0.08)
Max. elevation 0.04
(0.03)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS (LIML) OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instruments Sudan, elev. Sudan Sudan, elev. n/a Sudan, elev. Sudan
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 117 117
R-squared 0.04 0.036 0.04 0.065 0.408 0.48
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.81 n/a 0.81 n/a 0.38 n/a
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 16.81 21.26 16.81 n/a n/a n/a
F stat. (Cragg-Donald) n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.87 12.01
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 12: First Stage of Benchmark Regressions (Panel A) and Robustness IV (Panel B) for Identity.
3
Dep. var.: Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Identity Identity
Model: (3) (4) (7) (8)
All fighting -5.64*** -6.22*** 4.70*** 4.64***
(1.94) (1.85) (1.73) (1.41)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Sample w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN w/o AchGREG w/o AchETHN
Observations 1966 2156 1973 2163
R-squared 0.137 0.121 0.050 0.042
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in
all Probit regressions for clustering at county level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-
way clustering at county and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education,
Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic
Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of
Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate,
Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and ethnicity
characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 13: Robustness to removing Acholi regions
4
Dep. Var: Generalized trust in 2008 (ordinal scale)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -4.17***
(1.07)
Viol. Civil. -8.45***
(3.05)
Battles -7.20***
(1.74)
IDP -1.44***
(0.24)
Method
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Observations 2252 2252 2252 2252
Pseudo R-sq. 0.060 0.058 0.061 0.065
Note:  The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust,
clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education,
Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts
characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own
Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic
Fractionalization), and ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 14: Robustness to using Ordered Probit.
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.88*** 0.81***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.31) (0.31)
Insecure 0.06**
(0.03)
Violence Civil. 1.72***
(0.50)
Battles 1.63**
(0.66)
IDP 0.43***
(0.15)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2256 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.062 0.060 0.064 0.060 0.057 0.061
1st stage: Hansen J stat (p-value) n/a n/a 0.56 0.66 0.35 0.83 0.70
1st stage: F stat (Kleibergen-Paap) n/a n/a 26.4 25.6 19.3 28 26.2
Note: The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted in all Probit regressions for clustering at
district level, and in all OLS and 2SLS regressions for two-way clustering at district and ethnicity level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own
Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group,
Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration,
Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic Fractionalization), and
ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 15: Ethnic Identity (District Level).
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Panel A
Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All fighting -1.34*** -1.39***
(0.30) (0.47)
Violence Civil. -2.67**
(1.10)
Battles -2.66***
(0.80)
IDP -0.65***
(0.20)
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 49 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.632 0.670 0.683
Note: The unit of observation is a district. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity,
Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming,
Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate, Ethnic
Fractionalization, Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Panel B
Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All fighting 0.46* 0.90**
(0.26) (0.41)
Violence Civil. 1.68**
(0.83)
Battles 1.77**
(0.80)
IDP 0.43**
(0.19)
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 49 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R-squared 0.352 0.313 0.318 0.291 0.319
Note: The unit of observation is a district. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported districts characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity,
Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming,
Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate, Ethnic
Fractionalization, Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 16: Main regressions with data collapsed at the district level.
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Dep. Var: Trust gen. Trust know. Trust rel. Identity
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -4.15*** -3.41*** -0.80 2.89***
(1.21) (1.01) (0.81) (1.04)
Method IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit
Observations 2242 2240 2245 2256
Log Pseudolikelihood 4067.44 3877.14 4389.80 4278.17
Note:  The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust,
clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education,
Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts
characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own
Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), county characteristics (Ethnic
Fractionalization), and ethnicity characteristics (Ln of Past Slave Exports per Area).
Table 17: Robustness to using IVProbit.
8
Appendix B (not for publication): Data
Variables used in Section 3.3
First the dependent variables:
Generalized trust (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ugandans?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84C).
Trust in Known People (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level
and taking a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question
"How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other people you know?" from the
Afrobarometer 2008 (question Q84B).
Trust in relatives (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84A).
Ethnic identity (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I feel only (Rs ethnic group)" or "I feel more (Rs ethnic group) than Ugandan" is
answered to the question "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being
a _ [Rs Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q83).
The main independent variables:
Generalized trust (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question "Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing
with people?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q59).
Trust in other groups (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Ugandans from other ethnic groups" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60B).
Trust in own group (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Someone from your own ethnic group" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60A).
Ethnic identity (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Ethnic" to the question "We have spoken to many
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust variables:
Trust generalized 2008 2424 .3180693 .4658226 0 1
Trust known people 2008 2422 .5396367 .4985294 0 1
Trust relatives 2008 2429 .8369699 .3694692 0 1
Ethnic identity 2008 2431 .2073221 .4054717 0 1
Trust generalized 2000 2279 .1553152 .1020895 0 .34375
Trust own group 2000 2279 .8197781 .1325227 .4722222 1
Trust in others 2000 2279 .7015967 .1357914 .3958333 .9375
Ethnic identity 2000 2279 0.1212459 0.0804707 0 0.3191489
Ln slave exports per area 2431 0.0323932 0.0678196 0 0.8487026
Fighting variables (main specification):
Fighting events 2431 21.3262 45.9608 0 227
Violence against civilians 2431 7.946935 16.83046 0 94
Battles 2431 9.881119 26.42823 0 141
IDP 2431 0.0993206 0.250148 0 0.9458593
Socio-demographic variables:
Age 2421 33.70921 12.28614 18 81
Education 2431 .4960921 .5000876 0 1
Own TV 2428 .1214992 .3267738 0 1
Own radio 2430 .7353909 .4412156 0 1
Employed 2431 .3973673 .4894539 0 1
Female 2431 1.499383 .5001025 1 2
Urban 2431 1.79926 .4006367 1 2
District level variables:
Population 2431 588125.4 277121.5 127064 1189142
Urbanization 2431 13.28453 22.4144 1.1 100
Age Dependency Ratio 2431 110.7223 14.7269 64.2 132.8
Fractionalization 2431 .131371 .1885135 0 .6659015
Manufacturing Share 2431 2.39239 1.952001 .2 9.5
Subsistence Farming 2431 30.64801 21.05091 7.5 97.9
Net Migration 2431 0.1250925 5.878295 -11.4 17.5
Number of Micro Enterprises 2431 28193.41 22450.44 3952 103913
Adjusted Fertility Rate 2431 6.964583 0.967756 4 8.2
Unemployment 2431 4.572151 3.145646 0.8 15.4
Living condition variables:
Living conditions 2008 2420 .4801653 .4997097 0 1
Living conditions 2000 2279 .5599112 .1426186 .2363636 .8125
Instruments:
Distance from Sudan (in km) 2431 271.0786 132.5202 0 529.7582
Maximum elevation 2431 1605.039 748.8192 875 4688
Satellite Light:
Satellite Light 2008 125 .2728527 .8278942 0 6.753723
Satellite Light 2000 125 .3233163 .8965602 0 7.117774
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics
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Ugandans and they have all described themselves in di¤erent ways. Some people describe themselves
in terms of their region, language, ethnic group, religion, or gender. Others describe themselves in
economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or according to their occupation (e.g. a farmer
or a housewife). Besides being Ugandan, which specic group do you feel you belong to rst and
foremost?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q18).
Slave Exports by Area: This is the main slave trade variable from Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011), i.e. ln(1+[number of slave exports]/area).
Insecure: This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking a value of 0
if "Never" is answered and a value of 1 if "Just once or twice", "Several times", "Many times",
"Always", or "Dont know" is answered to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have
you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?" from the Afrobarometer 2008 (question
Q9C).
Fighting (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of ArcGIS
the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on the county level,
and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in a county taking place between the last
day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer
2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event
Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain
territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Violence Against Civilians (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated
with the help of ArcGIS the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on
the county level, and corresponds to the total amount of all events of the "Event Type" of "Violence
against civilians" in a county taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on
June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008).
Battles (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of ArcGIS
the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on the county level, and
corresponds to the total amount of all battle events in a county taking place between the last day
of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008
survey (on July 27, 2008). Concretely, it corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event
Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", and "Battle-Rebels
gain territory".
Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of internally displaced people per district
in 2006 (From UNHCR, 2006).
Fighting (Tribe): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have matched all ghting events to a
particular tribe (Q79) in the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (where feasible). In particular, this variable
varies on the tribe level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events linked to a tribe
taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst
day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events of
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the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory",
"Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Fighting (Tribe, County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of
ArcGIS the number of violent events per county and tribe (Q79). In particular, this variable varies on
the county and tribe level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in a county and
linked to a given tribe taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26,
2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum
of the events of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change
of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Additional individual level controls (not reported in the main Tables):
Age: Continuous variable that varies on the individual level. Answer to the question "How old
are you?" (question Q1) of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Education: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. Takes a value of 1 if the respon-
dent indicates at least an education level of 4 in the question Q89 of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Employed: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It
takes a value of 1 if "yes" (answer categories 2,3,4, and 5) is answered to the question "Do you have
a job that pays a cash income?" (question Q94).
Gender: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Male, 2=Female. From question Q101 of
the Afrobarometer 2008.
Rural: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Urban, 2=Rural. From question URBRUR
of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Own Radio: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008.
It takes a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you
personally own: Radio?" (question Q92A).
Own TV: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It takes
a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you personally
own: Television?" (question Q92B).
Additional district/county level controls (not reported in the main Tables):
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate: Adjusted total fertility rate in a given district in 2002. From
the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Age Dependency Ratio: Age dependency ratio in district in 2002. From the Census 2002
(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Ethnic Fractionalization: This is a continuous county level variable that varies between 0 and
1. Using the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman, 2010),
we obtain with the help of ArcGIS the percentage of the area of a given county that is occupied
by a given ethnic group. For each county fractionalization is computed using the following formula:
FRAC =
nP
i=1
sharei  (1  sharei).
Net migration: Net migration in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan
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Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Number of Micro-Enterprises: Number of micro-enterprises in a given district in 2002. From
the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Population: Total population in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics, 2002).
Share of Manufacture: Percentage of working population that are in the manufacturing sector
in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Share of Subsistence Farming: Percentage of working population that are in subsistence farm-
ing in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Unemployment Rate: Unemployment rate in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002
(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Urbanization: Urbanization rate in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics, 2002).
Ethnic (Tribe) FE: From variable Q79 ("What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural
group.") of Afrobarometer 2008.
Religion FE: From variable Q90 ("What is your religion, if any?") of Afrobarometer 2008.
Variables used in Section 5
Now we shall list the additional variables included in the empirical analysis of Section 5. Note that
when a variable is not listed this means that the variable denition detailed above applies. Further,
notice that for the living conditions regressions all variables are used on the individual level, while for
the satellite light regressions they are aggregated at the county level.
Living conditions (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "Neither good nor bad", "Fairly good", or "Very good" is answered to the question "In
general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?" from the Afrobarometer 2008
(question Q4B).
Living conditions (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Somewhat satised" or "Very satised" to the question
"How satised are you with: A. Your own living conditions today?" from the Afrobarometer 2000
(question Q8A).
Satellite nightlight (in 2000 and 2008): The data comes from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (2010). We use their data on Average Visible, Stable Lights, & Cloud
Free Coverages of their satellite F15/F16. In particular, we use their "cleaned" and "ltered" version
of the data, which "contains the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting,
including gas ares. Ephemeral events, such as res have been discarded. Then the background noise
was identied and replaced with values of zero. Data values range from 1-63." Using ArcGIS we
generate the county level average nightlight intensity.
13
